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Nature of the Landowner's Interest in
Oil and Gas
By A. W. WALKER, JR.*
Land is customarily described as if it consisted merely of a certain num-
ber of surface acres. The outer boundaries of the surface acreage can be lo-
cated by a survey on the ground, and a fence may be placed by the landowner
along the surveyed lines which stand as visible evidence to the world of the
extent of his ownership. The landowner, looking across the surface of his
land, may with justifiable pride say, "This is my land-I own everything
enclosed within my fence."
The lawyer knows that this is a superficial concept of the nature and ex-
tent of land ownership. A landowner owns, not the land, but only such
rights in land as the courts will recognize and protect. White it is custom-
ary and convenient to speak of "title" to and "ownership" of physical
property, in a strict legal sense these terms do not describe specific property
interests. Ownership consists not of the physical property itself, but of a
complex group or bundle of legally enforceable rights, powers and privileges
with respect to that physical property. Nor, does the physical property to
which those legal rights pertain consist merely of the surface of the land
as measured on an acreage basis and marked by fences. It is a maxim of
the common law, familiar to all lawyers, that "land," in its legal signif-
icance, extends from the surface downwards to the center of the earth and
upwards indefinitely to the skies.
"Land", therefore, as a subject of property, should be visualized not
as a flat plane but as a three-dimensional area having heighth and depth
as well as width and length. Within this area and in a state of nature are
to be found many different types of physical substances in addition to the
soil itself, such as the atmosphere above the surface, wild animals on the
surface, diffused surface waters, water in natural surface lakes, water in
natural watercourses, sub-surface percolating waters, subsurface solid min-
erals, and, in the case of some fortunate landowners, subsurface oil or gas.
While the exclusive right of possession of the landowner extends to the
entire three-dimensional area within which these various physical substances
are found, the law does not recognize that the landowner "owns" or "pos-
sesses" all of them. Indeed, the landowner's legal rights in and to these
various substances found over, on or under the surface of the land owned
by him differ greatly.
With the exception of oil and gas, our law with regard to property
rights in these various physical substances had its origin in the common
law of England. While there were no English precedents with regard to
property rights of a landowner in oil and gas, there was a fundamental com-
mon-law concept which has greatly influenced the development of the law
in the various producing states with regard to the nature of the land owner's
property rights in oil and gas i.e. the concept of possession.
Indeed, it would be difficult to over-estimate the importance of the
concept of possession in the determination of property rights under our
*Law firm of Robertson, Jackson, Payne, Lancaster & Walker; former Professor of
Law, University of Texas; Dallas, Texas.
22 1
Walker: Nature of the Landowner's Interest in Oil and Gas
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1955
NATURE OF LANDOWNER'S INTEREST
common-law system. Most of the common-law forms of action for the pro-
tection of 'rights in physical property were possessory actions maintainable
only by a person in possession, or with an immediate right to possession.
While actual possession in a legal sense is difficult to define, the principal
elements undoubtedly are a present power of control accompanied by an in-
tent to control.1  The landowner is regarded as having "title" to those
natural physical substances found within the area comprising his land which
are in his possession, such as the soil itself, water confined within a pond
on the surface of his land, and the solid minerals beneath the surface. He
has the present power of control and the intent to control these substances.
Likewise, he can acquire "title" to other natural physical substances, of
which he does not have possession, by legally reducing them to possession
on his land, such as wild animals, diffused surface waters, and waters with-
drawn from natural watercourses. With regard to percolating underground
waters, the law is not uniform. Some states follow what is called the "ab-
solute ownership" rule as to percolating underground waters, which seems
to be merely a rule permitting an unlimited right of withdrawal, while
others follow a "reasonable use" rule which restricts the landowner's right
of withdrawal upon some standard of reasonable use.'
When the courts in the United States were first called upon to deter-
mine the nature of the landowner's property rights in the oil and gas be-
neath his land they suffered from two handicaps: there were no common-
law precedents, and there was practically no scientific information with
regard to the nature of oil and gas deposits beneath the surface. It is not
surprising, therefore, that the courts undertook to apply by analogy the
precedents applicable to some other physical substances which the court
considered to resemble oil or gas in some legally significant respect.
Summers in his valuable work on Oil and Gas' has compared this judi-
cial process to the six blind men of Indostan who, upon feeling separate
parts of an elephant's anatomy, declared the elephant to be some other
type of animal with which they were already familiar, depending upon
what part of the elephant each had touched. Some courts said that oil and
gas were minerals found in rock formations beneath the surface and ap-
plied by analogy the law of solid minerals. Other courts, impressed by the
fact that oil is a fluid found in rocks beneath the surface, thought that the
law applicable to subterranean waters should be applied. Still other courts,
erroneously thinking that oil and gas were migratory in their natural state,
fancifully compared these minerals to wild animals.
The analogy to wild animals was never carried to its logical conclusion
even in Pennsylvania where it was first announced.' Indeed, that state
adopted the ownership-in-place theory. As pointed out by the Supreme
Court of the United States in the early great case of Ohio Oil Co. v. The
State of Indiana,* if the analogy to wild animals was complete, it would fol-
low not only that the landowner has no "title" to the oil and gas beneath
'HOLMES, COMMON LAW, 206-246 (1881) ; POLLOCK AND WRIGHT, ESSAY ON POSSESSION
IN THE COMMON LAw (1883) ; SALMOND, JujISRuoDENcE (7th ed.), 293-328 (1924).
2See annotations in 55 A.L.R. 1388; 109 A.L.R. 397.
41 SUMMERS, OIL Ai GAS (Perm. ed.), 20-27.
'Westmoreland & Cambria Natural Gas Co. v. DeWitt, 130 Pa. 235, 18 A. 724, 5 A.L.R.
731 (1899).
5177 U.S. 190, 20 Sup. Ct. 576, 44 L. Ed. 729 (1900).
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his land but also that he would have no character of "property" interest in
the oil and gas that would be subject to constitutional guarantees against
the taking of "property" since it is well-established that game laws which
completely deprive a landowner of his right to capture wild animals on his
land are valid inasmuch as they do not involve the taking of property. The
court in that early case recognized, as it is generally recognized today, that
there is no complete analogy between oil and gas and any of the other
physical substances found over, on, or under the surface of the land. They
are a unique species of property and property rights in them must be de-
termined upon the basis of their own peculiarities.
All oil and gas producing jurisdictions now recognize that the land-
owner has some type of "property" interest in the oil and gas beneath his
land which is subject to protection against confiscation by state or federal
legislation. This property interest is something more than the exclusive
privilege to drill wells on his land in search for oil and gas. The landowner
has a somewhat similar exclusive privilege to hunt for wild animals on his
land, but he has no property interest in the wild animals themselves until
reduced to possession. All courts apparently recognize that a landowner
does have some type of "property" interest in the oil and gas beneath his
land even before it is reduced to possession. The difficulty has been in
identifying the exact nature of this property interest. Does it amount to
"title," or to something less than "title"?
What is there in the physical nature and condition of these substances
as they exist in an underground reservoir which has caused this difficulty
in identifying the nature of the landowner's property interest in them ? Oil
and gas are inanimate objects. Contrary to early beliefs, we know today
that they are not found in underground running streams or ponds, and that
they do not percolate through subsurface strata like subterranean water.
Instead, oil and gas as usually encountered merely occupy the minute pore
spaces in some sandstone, limestone or other porous formation. They are
not migratory in their natural state. Indeed, we know that it is absolutely
essential to the existence of commercial deposits of oil and gas that they be
securely entrapped within a closed subsurface structure from which escape
is impossible. If this reservoir is located entirely beneath one landowner's
land-and there are some such reservoirs--the landowner has complete con-
trol of the oil and gas beneath his land. Under such circumstances it would
seem clear that the landowner has possession since the oil and gas is within
his exclusive power of control. No possible objection is seen to regarding
him as also having title.
Where, however, various landowners own lands overlying a common
reservoir of oil and gas the power of control of each individual landowner
over that part of the oil and gas underlying his land is not complete. Col-
lectively, the landowners over the common reservoir do have absolute control
over the entire deposit of oil and gas. In this respect their power of control
over the oil and gas is entirely unlike their power of control--or, rather,
lack of power of control--over wild animals on their land, or over sub-
terranean water percolating through their lands. However, the individual
landowners over the common reservoir cannot prevent such drainage of oil
or gas from their lands to the lands of other landowners over the same
3
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reservoir as will naturally occur by reason of pressure variations within the
common reservoir resulting from drilling and producing operations.
The fact that oil and gas are not respecters of man-made private-prop-
erty lines in their obedience to the laws of physics has caused courts the
greatest difficulty in deciding the exact nature of the landowner's property
interest in these minerals. As a practical matter, because of the manner in
which oil and gas must be produced by means of wells drilled into the
saturated underground formation, the courts were virtually compelled to
decide-as they did-that a landowner could not be held liable for drainage
of oil or gas from his neighbor's land resulting from otherwise legal and
non-negligent producing operations, and that an operator had title to all
oil and gas produced from his well even though some of the oil or gas pro-
duced from his well might have been located under his neighbor's land
when it was in its natural state in the reservoir. This rule of non-liability
for drainage, commonly referred to in recent years as the "'Rule of cap-
ture," is believed to be the law in all oil and gas producing states, although
the unlimited right to drill and to produce has been greatly modified and
regulated by conservation laws or regulations.
The rule, and the reason for the rule, was early expressed by a Penn-
sylvania Court in Barnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co.' as follows:
" 'The right of every landowner to drill a well on his own land at
whatever spot he may see fit' certainly must be conceded. If, then
the landowner drills on his own land at such a spot as best sub-
serves his purposes, what is the standing of the adjoining land-
owner whose oil or gas'may be drained by this well? He certainly
ought not to be allowed to stop his neighbor from developing his
own farm. There is no way of ascertaining how much of the oil
and gas that comes out of the well was when it was in situ under
this farm and how much under that. What then has been held to be
the law ? It is this, as we understand it, every landowner or his
lessee may locate his wells wherever he pleases, regardless of the
interests of others. He may distribute them over the whole farm or
locate them only on one part of it. He may crowd the adjoining
farms so as to enable him to draw the oil and gas from them. What
then can the neighbor do? Nothing; only go and do-likewise. He
must protect his own oil and gas. He knows it is wild and will run
away if it finds an opening and it is his business to keep it at home.
This may not be the best rule but neither the Legislature nor our
highest court has given us any better."
While this rule has been criticized, it is difficult to see how any other
rule could have been adopted by the courts. An operator should not be re-
quired to get a court decree in order to make a well location or to fix the
amount of oil or gas that he may legally produce. Judicial processes are not
appropriate to control such matters as the spacing and location of wells or
to regulate the production from wells. These are matters that can only be
regulated by administrative agencies under statutory authorization.
If the courts, in the absence of legislation, had entertained suits to en-
join the drilling of wells which would cause drainage, or if they had held
that landowners, or their lessees, are liable in damages for draining oil and
gas from beneath their neighbors' lands, the development of any oil and gas
"216 Pa. 362, 65 A. 801 (1907).
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field would have necessitated the filing of innumerable actions and cross-
actions for the protection of property rights. Indeed, as a result the lawyers
probably would have profited more from the development of an oil and gas
reservoir than the producers. The remdy of self-help by the drilling of
offsetting wells to counteract or equalize drainage across private-property
lines quite properly appealed to the courts as a more practical remedy for
the landowner being drained than the allowance of a judicial remedy either
by way of an injunction or in the form of a monetary recovery of damages
for drainage.
The adoption of this rule of non-liability for drainage, or so-called "rule
of capture," posed difficulties, however, in regarding the landowner as
having title to the oil and gas beneath his land. How could he be said to
have "title" when he did not have a sufficient power of control to prevent
his neighbor from draining some of his oil and gas from beneath his land,
and, particularly, when the courts held that he could not recover from his
neighbor for having done so? Some courts concluded that these objections
were sufficient to preclude recognition of "title" in the landowner, while
other courts decided otherwise, with the result that today we have some jur-
isdictions following an ownership theory and other courts following a non-
ownership theory. This is probably an over-simplification of existing
theories of property rights in oil and gas, but is sufficiently accurate for
the purposes of this discussion.
It is of interest to note how Texas, one of the leading "ownership"
states, has answered the objections made in "non-ownership" states to the
adoption of the "ownership" theory. In Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas
Oil & Gas Co.,' the Supreme Court of Texas stated:
"The objection lacks substantial foundation that gas or oil in a
certain tract of land cannot be owned in place, because subject to
appropriation, without the consent of the owner of the tract,
through drainage from wells on adjacent lands. If the owners of
adjacent lands have the right to appropriate, without liability, the
gas and oil underlying their neighbor's land, then their neighbor
has the correlative right to appropriate, through like methods of
drainage, the gas and oil underlying the tracts adjacent to his own.
* * * Ultimate injury from the net results of drainage, where proper
diligence is used, is altogether too conjectural to form the basis for
the denial of a right of property in that which is not only plainly
as much realty as any other part of the earth's contents, but realty
of the highest value to mankind, and often worth far more than
anything else on or beneath the surface within the proprietor's
boundaries."
The "correlative right" to which the court referred is the remedy of self-
help by the drilling of offset wells which will serve to equalize the net
drainage between the two tracts. The principle apparently enunciated is
that there is no need to give an injured party a cause of action for the viola-
tion of some legal right resulting from a reasonable use of adjacent land if
the aggrieved party's remedy of self-help is reasonably adequate for his pro-
tection. This principle has been applied in denying a judicial remedy for
the invasion of a landowner's exclusive right of possession by branches of
trees growing on adjacent lands. Some courts have held that the remedy
'113 Tex. 160, 254 S.W. 290, 29 A.L.R. 566 (1923).
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of self-help by cutting the overhanging branches is adequate, and that no
judicial remedy is necessary. For example, the Supreme Court of Mas-
sachusetts, in a case8 of this type, declared:
"His remedy is in his own hands. The common sense of the com-
mon law has recognized that it is wiser to leave the individual to
protect himself, if harm results to him from this exercise of an-
other's right to use his property in a reasonable way, than to sub-
ject that other to the annoyance, and the public to the burden, of
actions at law, which would be likely to be innumerable, and, in
many instances, purely vexations."
Perhaps the landowner's remedy of self-help by drilling of offsetting
wells for the purpose of counteracting and equalizing drainage is not as
completely adequate as the self-help remedy available to a landowner who
objects to the intrusion of the branches of his neighbor's trees across his
boundary line. In any event, the courts of the states folowing the "non-
ownership" theory have not thought this or any other answer to be suf-
ficient to support a theory of ownership-in-place of oil and gas.
One of the best-reasoned cases following what may be classified gen-
erally as a "non-ownership" theory is the early United States Supreme
Court case of Ohio Oil Co. v. The State of Indiana! While the court in
that case did not regard an individual landowner over a common reservoir
of oil and gas as having title to the specific oil and gas beneath his land, it
did recognize that he had a "property" interest in the oil and gas in the
common reservoir which was subject to constitutional protection. It pointed
out that the public-at-large had no property rights in the oil and gas con-
fined within a reservoir underlying the lands of a limited group of land-
owners. Indeed, it referred to this limited group of landowners as the
"collective owners" of the oil and gas, stating that each landowner had a
"co-equal right-to take from a common source of supply," and held that
the legislative power of a state could be exercised for the purpose of pro-
tecting these private property rights by preventing one of the landowners
over the common reservoir from wasting gas produced from the common
source of supply to the injury of others having co-equal rights to take oil
and gas therefrom.
The idea behind this theory seems to be that the oil and gas is securely
entrapped in a reservoir located entirely within lands owned by a limited
group of landowners. Collectively, although not individually, these land-
owners have control over the oil and gas and possession of it, and, therefore,
may be regarded as "collective owners" of it despite the fact that it may
migrate back and forth across the property lines of this limited group of
landowners.
This case is frequently cited with approval, in "ownership" states as
well as in "non-ownership" states for its recognition of the existence of
"correlative rights" between the owners of land overlying a common reser-
voir of oil and gas, and no reason is seen why the "ownership" theory should
be regarded as inconsistent with the recognition of the existence of correla-
tive rights between the various landowners. As a matter of fact, there are
correlative rights between landowners even in the use and enjoyment of the
8Michalson v. Nutting, 275 Mass. 232,175 N.E. 490, 76 A.L.R. 1109 (1931).
"177 U.S. 190, 20 Sup. Ct. 576, 44 L. Ed. 729 (1900).
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surface of their lands. No landowner has the right to use the surface of
his land to the extent that he unreasonably interferes with the correlative
right of his neighbor to use and enjoy his land. Similarly, no landowner,
even if he is regarded as owning the oil and gas beneath his land, has the
right to drill for and produce that oil and gas in a manner which unrea-
sonably interferes with his neighbor's correlative right to drill for and pro-
duce his oil and gas.
Nor, is it believed that the so-called "rule of capture," properly under-
stood, is in any way inconsistent with the existence of "correlative rights."'
Certainly, this is true if the "rule of capture" is regarded in its true light
merely as a rule of non-liability for drainage. If-and this argument is
sometimes made-it should be regarded as giving an affirmative right in the
nature of a property right to capture a neighbor's oil or gas, it may be
urged that the recognition of such an affirmative property right in each
landowner would be inconsistent with the recognition of any correlative
rights between them. This argument, however, defeats itself for if each
landowner has such an affirmative right the exercise of this right by any
one of the landowners impinges upon the exercise of similar affirmative
rights of the other landowners, and the courts are compelled to recognize
the existence of correlative rights. Moreover, this is not believed to be a
proper view of the "rule of capture," which is merely another name for
the rule of "non-liability for drainage."' For example, in Texas, an own-
ership state, it is held that both the "rule of capture" and the doctrine of
"correlative rights" are applicable in solving property-right problems in-
volving oil and gas.'
It is important to understand that landowners over a common reservoir
have correlative rights in the oil and gas within that reservoir regardless of
whether the jurisdiction follows the "ownership" theory or the "non-owner-
ship" theory, and that the rule of non-liability for drainage, or so-called
''rule of capture" is not inconsistent with the recognition and enforcement
of these correlative rights. Legislation is not necessary for the creation of
correlative rights. Those rights already exist at common-law. Legislation,
however, is needed to give more effective protection to the correlative rights
of the owners over a common reservoir than can be given by the courts by
means of ordinary judicial processes. When a legislature enacts laws
which regulate drilling and producing operations for the protection of cor-
relative rights it is not changing the common law property rights of a land-
owner in the oil and gas beneath his land.' It is protecting those rights by
imposing restrictions upon the drilling and producing operations of each
landowner or operator which will increase the total recovery of oil and gas
from the reservoir, and which enable each landowner to secure his fair share
of such increased recovery. It is merely extending greater protection to the
'OR. E. Hardwicke, The Rule of Capture and It# Implications A8 Applied to Oil and
Gas (1935), 13 TEXAS LAW REv. 391.
"A. W. Walker, Jr., Property Rights in Oil and Gas and Their Effect Upon Police
Regulation of Production (1938), 16 TEXAS LAW REv. 370.
'Brown v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 12(0 Tex. 296, 83 S.W.2d 935, 87 S.W.2d 1069,
99 A.L.R. 1107 (1935).
"Legislative controls for the purpose of protecting correlative private rights are valid
even when not imposed for the purpose of preventing waste in the public interest.
Corzelius v. Harrell, 143 Tex. 509, 186 S.W.2d 961 (1945). See, also, Thompson v.
Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 57 Sup. Ct. 364, 81 L. Ed. 510 (1937).
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correlative property rights of the landowners by legislative and administra-
tive processes than the courts were able to extend by reason of the limited
scope of judicial processes.
As a matter of fact, the particular theory adopted by a producing state
-although it has important legal consequences in other respects--has had
little effect upon the landowner's rights to drill for and produce oil and gas
beneath his land. His rights in this respect are very similar in all jurisdic-
tions. Whether or not he is regarded as having "title," he is regarded as
having a "property" interest. In the absence of some controlling statute
or administrative regulation, he may locate his wells on his land wherever
he desires, and he has title to all oil and gas legally produced from his wells
regardless of where this oil or gas may have been originally located in the
reservoir. These rights to drill and to produce, however, in all jurisdic-
tions may be regulated and controlled by the state in the exercise of its
police power either for the purpose of protecting the correlative private-
property rights of the landowners over a common reservoir or for the pur-
pose of protecting the public's interest in the conservation of these natural
resources of the state. It will be noted that regulations for the prevention
of waste may be sustained on either one or both of these police power pur-
poses.
Even without the aid of legislation the judicial process was effective to
give some protection to the correlative property rights of the landowners
over a common reservoir. While drainage per se was not actionable it was
recognized that acts of a producer which were injurious to the common
reservoir might be actionable. For example, it was early declared in Manu-
facturers' Gas & Oil Co. v. Indiana Gas & Oil Co.," that, "Independently,
however, of any statute,-the common owners of the gas in the common
reservoir, separately or together, have the right to enjoin any and all acts
of another owner which will materially injure, or which will involve the
destruction of the property in the common fund or supply of gas." In that
case it was claimed that a pump being used to increase the flow of gas from
a well threatened to injure the common reservoir by causing the rapid en-
croachment of salt water into the gas section of the producing formation.
Other examples of actionable wrongs at common law by one of the producers
from a common reservoir are cases where judicial remedies have been recog-
nized for the prevention of waste of gas from a well,' or where damages
have been recovered against one operator for injury to the reservoir caused
by the use of an excessive charge of nitroglycerin in shooting a well."
Sometimes great injury is done to a reservoir by the blow-out of a gas
well as a result of the negligence of an operator, and there have been several
cases wherein some of the other operators have sought to recover damages
for the resulting injury to their property. In Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co."
landowners sued the operator of an adjoining tract of land for damages re-
sulting from such a blow-out. It was established that the blow-out resulted
1155 Ind. 461, 57 N.E. 912, 50 L.R.A. 768 (1900).
'Louisville Gas Co. v. Kentucky Heating Co., 132 Ky. 435, 111 S.W. 374 (1909).
"Comanche Duke Oil Co. v. Texas & Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 298 S.W. 554 (Tex. Comm.
App., 1927).
7146 Tex. 575, 210 S.W.2d 558 (1948), subsequent opinion in Texas Court of Civil
Appeals, 216 S.W.2d 824 (1948).
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from the negligence of the operator, and that a large amount of the gas and
distillate under the land of the plaintiffs had been caused to drain onto the
land of the defendant and to escape into the air through the crater caused
by the blow-out. The plaintiff-landowners had leased their land to a dif-
ferent operator, reserving a royalty, and the jury found that their royalty
share of the gas and distillate which had been drained from their land and
lost into the air had a market value of $148,548.00, for the value of which
judgment was given. This judgment was affirmed on appeal.
This case is of particular interest because of the fundamental questions
of property law involved. The defendant contended that while it might be
held liable for damages to the reservoir, the law of capture precluded the
plaintiffs from recovering for the value of the gas and distillate which had
drained from their lands onto the land of the defendant, and which there-
after was wasted into the air. It was urged that under the rule of capture
this gas and distillate ceased to be the property of the plaintiffs and became
the property of the defendant as soon as it crossed the boundary line be-
tween the two tracts of land. The court stated that while "under the law
of capture there is no liability for reasonable and legitimate drainage, "
and while "there is a certain amount of reasonable and necessary waste in-
cident to the production of oil and gas to which the non-liability rule must
also apply, we do not think this immunity should be extended so as to in-
clude the negligent waste or destruction of the oil and gas." The following
statement of the court is of particular interest:
". .. the negligent waste and destruction of petitioners' gas and
distillate was neither a legitimate drainage of the minerals from
beneath their lands, 'nor a lawful or reasonable appropriation of
them. Consequently, the petitioners did not lose their right, title
and interest in them under the law of capture."
In addition to the important limitation placed by the court upon the
application of the rule of capture, it should be noted that this is one type of
case; where the theory ownership or non-ownership became important, not
as to the availability of a remedy, but as to the proper measure of damages.
The measure of damages applied in that case would probably not be appro-
priate in a non-ownership state.'
While the courts have been willing, without the aid of a statute, to en-
join specific producing operations causing waste or injury to the common
reservoir, or to award monetary damages for negligent injuries to the prop-
erty rights of a landowner in the oil and gas beneath his land, they have
been unwilling, unless specifically authorized by statute, to issue manda-
tory decrees requiring an operator to join with other operators in future
joint programs for preventing waste by increasing the ultimate recovery
from a reservoir. For example, a California court in Western Gulf Oil Co.
v. Superior Oil Co.' stated that it could not issue a mandatory decree re-
'8See, McCoy v. Arkansas Natural Gas Co., 175 La. 487, 143 So. 383, 85 A.L.R. 1147,
on second appeal, 191 La. 332, 185 So. 274 (1938). In the Bliff case the court as-
sumed without expressly deciding that the lease executed by the plaintiffs had not
divested them of title in place to their royalty one-eighth of the gas. Where the
royalty on gas is a fractional share of the market value of the gas it is usually held
that title to all of the gas is vested in the lessee.
92 Cal. App. 2d 299, 206 P.2d 944 (1949). Actually the relief sought by the plead-
ings of the plaintiffs in this case was not for a mandatory decree requiring the de-
fendants to join in a unit operation program, but was to enjoin the defendants from
9
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quiring gas to be re-injected in the reservoir although this would have pre-
vented waste. The court considered that the prevention of waste by the in-
auguration of joint, expensive programs of this nature involved questions
of public policy within the purview of the legislative power but beyond the
power and jurisdiction of the courts. The Supreme Court of Arkansas
adopted a similar view in the case of Dobson v. Arkansas Oil & Gas Com-
missiane in holding that even an administrative agency with broad statu-
tory powers to prevent waste could not enter a compulsory unitization order
for the prevention of waste without express statutory authority.
While conservation statutes and administrative regulations issued pur-
suant thereto are beyond the scope of the topics assigned to me for discus-
sion, it should be noted that the restrictions sometimes imposed thereunder
upon the common-law rights of a landowner are frequently attacked on con-
stitutional grounds as constituting an unlawful taking of property. Such
attackq have required the courts to examine carefully the exact nature of a
landowner's property right, and to undertake to define that property right.
For example, in cases of this type of Texas courts have declared that,
"Every owner oe lessee is entitled to a fair chance to recover the oil or gas
in or under his land, or their equivalent in kind, and any denial of such fair
chance amounts to confiscation."'
It is believed that this is a reasonably accurate general statement of the
landowner's property right whether his land is located in an "ownership"
state or a "non-ownership" state. Implicit in this definition of a land-
owner's property right is the recognition of correlative rights since each
landowner must be protected against confiscation on the same basis as every
other landowner. It will be noted, however, that all the law requires is that
each landowner be given a " fair chance" to recover from the common reser-
voir his just share of the oil and gas. If he fails to avail himself of this op-
portunity by properly developing his land, he has no legal right to com-
plain. And it will be noted further that this statement of the nature of his
property right also defines what he should have a "fair chance" to recover;
i.e., the oil or gas in or under his land, or their equivalent in kind. It recog-
nizes that drainage will occur, and that it is impossible even for a diligent
operator to recover the specific oil and gas under his land, but he should
be entitled to a chance to recover oil and gas of an amount equivalent to
the recoverable oil and gas under his land.
This general statement, however, does not specifically cover one aspect
of the problem. Is the amount of oil and gas which a landowner should
have a "fair chance" to recover the amount which was beneath his land at
the time the, reservoir was first discovered, or the amount of oil that is be-
neath his land from day to day as the reservoir is depleted by production ?
It could not very well be the amount in place beneath each landowner's land
at the time the field was first discovered since all lands over the reservoir
are not developed at one and the same time. Land that is not placed in
conducting their operations in a wasteful manner, it being alleged that plaintiffs
had offered to permit the defendants to join in a unit operations program which
would prevent waste.
0218 Ark. 160, 235 S.W.2d 33 (1950).
"Marrs v. Railroad Commission, 142 Tex. 294, 177 S.W.2d 941 (1944).
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production until late in the life of the field must necessarily suffer loss from
drainage to the more diligent operators.
Furthermore, we know today that there is not only local drainage be-
tween adjacent properties but in many fields that there is also regional or
field-wide drainage due to expanding gas caps exerting pressure down-
structure against the face of the oil at the point of gas-oil' contact, or due to
a water-drive exerting a pressure up-structure against the face of the oil at
the point of oil-water contact. For example, in the East Texas field the
regional water drive is constantly pushing oil up-structure from west to
east. As a consequence of this regional drainage there is today beneath some
of the lands on the eastern side of the reservoir as much oil as was beneath
those lands when the field first began to produce some twenty-five years
ago. And the same amount of oil will be beneath those lands ten years
from now since as oil is withdrawn from those lands it is constantly being
replaced with oil from the west.
The extent and efficiency of this regional drainage in the East Texas
field has doubtless been greatly increased over what it would have been
under unregulated production by reason of re-injection of salt water along
the western edge of the field and by the stringent curtailment of oil produc-
tion under proration orders designed to preserve uniform bottom-hole pres-
sures in the field. In other words, the natural advantages enjoyed by
properties located far above the water-oil contact level have been increased
by artificial means so that drainage to those properties is in excess of what
it would have been in the absence of these artificial factors. Furthermore,
the efficient water-drive resulting from salt-water injection and pressure
maintenance has greatly increased the amount of oil which will be ultimate-
ly recovered from this field. Nevertheless, the Railroad Commission of
Texas has not deemed the increased regional drainage to be a factor for con-
sideration in formulating proration orders for the East Texas field.
Disregarding exceptional situations of this kind, it would seem that,
under conservation regulations which do nothing more than control the
spacing of wells and prorate the production of those wells currently on a
day-by-day basis, the "fair chance" to recover the oil and gas beneath a
tract of land, or its equivalent in kind, must refer to the oil and gas which
is from day-to-day beneath the land, and not to the amount of oil and gas
originally in place beneath the land. This view, of course, assumes that any
natural advantages from regional drainage which would have been enjoyed
at common law under unregulated production by reason of the favorable
location of a tract of land on the structure should be preserved. The extent
to which artificially increased regional drainage resulting from this type of
regulatory control should be considered in formulating a fair proration
order presents difficult engineering as well as legal problems which yet re-
main to be solved.
Proration formulas are many and varied but it is the usual practice,
when a field is produced on a competitive basis under this type of regula-
tory control, to adopt a proration formula under which the total field allow-
able is allocated among the various producing wells upon a basis which gives
each operator a "fair chance" to recover the oil and gas beneath the acreage
assigned to each well, or its equivalent in kind, during the time the order is
11
Walker: Nature of the Landowner's Interest in Oil and Gas
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1955
NATURE OF LANDOWNER'S INTEREST
to remain in effect. As the field is depleted, however, revisions are made
in the distribution of the field allowable on the basis of changed conditions.
Where a reservoir is unitized for the purposes of production, how-
ever, other factors are involved. In such cases usually a pressure mainte-
nance or re-pressuring program is inaugurated to supplement natural reser-
voir pressures or to supply entirely new pressures. Each landowner con-
tributes at one and the same time, i.e. the time of unitization, the oil beneath
his land to the common fund and reaps the benefit thereafter of greatly in-
creased production due to the artificially supplied pressures which all of the
operators have joined together in supplying to the common reservoir. Fre-
quently, the ultimate production from the reservoir may be two or three
times what it would have been if only natural reservoir pressures had been
utilized in producing the oil. Each landowner's just, proportionate share
of the total recovery achieved by such artificial means in a unitized field
sbould not be determined by the same standard that would have been em-
ployed if the reservoir had been depleted without unitization and by the use
only of natural reservoir pressures. Under unitization all landowners share
in the total recovery from the entire reservoir regardless of where the oil
was produced, and their proportionate share of the total recovery is usually
based upon some participation factor or formula which reflects the ratio
between the recoverable oil in place beneath each landowner's land at the
time unitization was effected and the total recoverable oil in the entire reser-
voir at that time. This participation factor remains constant until the en-
tire reservoir has been depleted, with the result that an individual land-
owner may continue to receive his fixed percentage share of the production
from the entire reservoir long after all recoverable oil has been drained from
beneath his particular tract of land.
Thus far we have discussed the property rights between the landowners
over a common reservoir and the problems incident to drilling and produc-
ing conducted by each landowner or operator on his own land. Other prob-
lems are raised where the drilling or producing operations are conducted
by a trespasser. Some of these will be briefly discussed.
It is interesting to note that what is believed to be the first case dealing
with property rights in oil and gas beneath the surface involved a trespass.
In 1854, some five years prior to the completion of the famous Drake well-
the first well ever drilled for oil in the United States-a Kentucky court de-
cided the case of Hail v. Reed.' The well involved-strange as it may seem
to us today-had been drilled for the production of salt water, or brine, and
the extraction of salt. The salt water formation apparently had been con-
taminated by the presence of oil, and a trespasser went on the land and by
the use of a bucket removed some of the oil that had collected on top of the
brine in the well. In a suit brought for trespass and conversion of the oil
the trespasser contended that, while he might be liable for trespass on the
land, he could not be guilty of conversion of the oil since the landowner
had never reduced it to possession. It was his position that oil was analogous
to wild animals in which the landowner has no property interest until they
are reduced to possession. The landowner contended that he was in pos-
session of the oil just like he was in possession of solid minerals. The court
did not find it necessary to decide which of these analogies was applicable
'54 Ky. (B. Mon.) 479 (1854).
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since it concluded that, even if the oil while still in the well was not in the
landowner 's possession, nevertheless, the trespasser under established com-
mon-law principles would be regarded as having reduced it to possession for
the landowner, and as having converted it after title had been vested in the
landowner.
This case is interesting not only because it is apparently the first case to
discuss property rights in oil, but also for the solemn declaration made by
the court in its opinion that "oil is a peculiar liquid, not necessary nor in-
deed suitable for the common use of man." It apparently had some value,
however, even at that early date-probably as a base for a patent medicine
-since the plaintiff alleged that it had a market value of $1.45 per gallon,
which any oil man today would regard as a pretty fair price for oil.
Trespass cases today are not so simple as this early case where oil was
wrongfully taken by means of a bucket lowered into a well, but the principle
of law announced in that case is equally applicable today. Most of our tres-
pass cases today involve an unlawful entry into a landowner's land either by
a well wrongfully located and bottomed on that land, or by a well lawfully
located on one tract of land but wrongfully bottomed on another tract of
land. In both types of cases the exclusive right of possession of the land-
owner has been violated by the physical location of the producing section of
the well bore within a portion of the producing formation underneath the
surface of that landowner's tract of land and within the three-dimensional
area to which he has the exclusive right of possession. Whether or not the
landowner is regarded as having title to the oil or gas so wrongfully re-
moved from his land, in any event it has been reduced to possession by a
trespasser, and the landowner should be permitted to recover for its con-
version.
One of the most interesting cases involving a trespass by means of a
directionally-drilled well is Alphonzo E. Bell Corp. v. Bell View Oil Syn-
dicate." The Syndicate drilled two wells which were rightfully located on
a tract of land 60 feet wide by 240 feet deep which overlaid a down-struc-
ture portion of the reservoir. Both wells departed several hundred feet
from the vertical in an up-structure direction, and passed entirely through
an adjoining tract of land and were bottomed on a third tract of land. The
casing was perforated at the place where the well-bore penetrated the pro-
ducing formation underlying both the intervening tract of land and the
third tract of land. The case arose in California-a state which does not re-
gard the landowner as having title to oil and gas in place. The defendant
argued that the landowners over this common reservoir were collective own-
ers in the sense that they had common rights to take from a common source
of supply, and that it did not make any difference whether their wells were
bottomed under their lands or under neighboring lands so long as they were
bottomed in a common reservoir of which they were one of the co-owners.
The court refused to follow this argument and stated that the defendant
was guilty of a trespass.
The defendant advanced the further ingenious argument that even if
it was guilty of a trespass, there could be no recovery against it unless the
plaintiffs could prove that the wells of the defendant had already produced
more than their just share of the oil out of the common reservoir. The basis
2324 Cal. App.2d 587, 76 P,2d 167 (1938).
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of this argument was a contention that the co-owners over the common
reservoir were cotenants of the oil in the reservoir, and that the plaintiffs
had sustained no injury unless the defendant had already produced more
than its just share as a cotenant. The court likewise refused to approve this
theory of property rights in the common reservoir and held the defendant
accountable for every barrel of oil produced, even though the wells, if they
had been vertically drilled, might have ultimately recovered from the reser-
voir as much or more oil than had been produced to the time of trial by the
directionally-drilled wells.
In many of the producing states today a special permit is required to
be obtained by the operator from an administrative agency for the inten-
tional drilling of a directional well, and many states require that a well
survey be made of a well upon its completion, and will not grant it a produc-
tion allowable if it departs more than a certain number of degrees from the
vertical. These are desirable regulations since it is possible for an operator
to secure a secret advantage over his neighbors by bottomoing his well under
neighboring land, or even under his own land at some point more favorably
located on the structure than the point directly beneath his authorized well
location. As a practical matter, the discovery of this type of wrongful con-
duct is difficult, but the courts will in a proper case order a well survey to
be made if the applicant is willing to execute an indemnity bond for dam-
ages that may be caused to the well as a result of the survey, and in the
event that the survey reveals that the well was properly drilled."
Where the trespass consists of the drilling of a well located and bot-
tomed upon the same tract of land the problems are less difficult. In both
ownership and non-ownership states the true owner would have title to all
oil and gas actually produced from the well. The chief problem is one of
damages. The general rule is that if the trespasser acted in good faith he
should be allowed to offset against his liability for the market value of all
oil and gas produced the reasonable costs incurred in producing the oil and
gas, but that if he acted in bad faith this right of offset is denied.' The
tests employed by the courts of the various states in determining whether
the trespasser acted in good or bad faith are not uniform.' Some courts
have been inclined to lay down arbitrary rules, such as whether the expendi-
tures were made after notice of an adverse claim or after suit was filed by
the adverse claimant, or even whether the mistake of the trespasser was one
of law as distinguished from a mistake of fact. Other courts have made the
fides of the trespasser purely a question of fact as to whether he had reason-
able grounds to think that he had title. Where the latter standard is em-
ployed it would be seldom indeed that an oil operator would be considered
a bad faith trespasser since only under exceptional circumstances would an
operator risk the large amount of money required to drill a well unless he
had some reasonable grounds to believe that he had title.
'Hastings Oil Co. v. Texas Co., 149 Tex. 416, 234 S.W. 2d 389 (1950) ; Williams v.
Continental Oil Co., 215 F. 2d 4 (1954) ; Gliptis v. Fifteen Oil Co., 204 La. 896, 16 So.
2d 471 (1944).
'51 SUMMERS, OIL AND GAS (Perm. ed.), 48-65. Drilling costs may not be allowed in
the exceptional case where the wells drilled by the trespasser are not needed by the
true owner to produce his oil. Carter Oil Co. v. McCasland, 207 F.2d 728 (1953).
'KuLP, OIL AND GAS RIGHTS, 531; 1 SUMMERS, OIL AND GAS, 3548, See comment in
12 TEXAS LAw REv. 210.
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There is much to be said in favor of this standard as applied to oil and
gas operations. In the case of ordinary improvements on land the possessor
can usually afford to defer making the improvements until an adverse claim
of title has been settled. In the case of oil and gas property, however, the
operator frequently holds under a lease which may terminate if he fails to
drill. And, even if he is not compelled to drill in order to hold his lease, he
may suffer great injury from drainage if he defers drilling operations until
adverse title claims can be finally adjudicated.
An interesting question is presented when a judgment is secured against
a good-faith trespasser who has not been producing long enough for the total
market value of the oil and gas produced down to the time of the trial to
equal the drilling and producing costs. He can, of course, offset those costs
against his liability as a converter. However, he cannot obtain an affirma-
tive judgment for the difference representing unrecovered drilling and com-
pletion costs.' He must surrender possession to the true owner with his pro-
ducing wells and their equipment on the premises. In this situation it would
seem that the good faith trespasser should be entitled to some type of relief.
In some cases, it has been stated that an oil well is a permanent improve-
ment as that term is used in the "betterment" statutes." However, it would
not appear to be fair to the true owner to require him to pay for the en-
hancement in the value of the land attributable to the unrecovered costs of
the wells and equipment as a condition to being restored to possession of his
land in accordance with the usual provisions of "betterment" statutes where
other types of permanent improvements have been made on land by a good
faith trespasser. This would put the risk upon the true owner of the wells
continuing to produce enough oil to repay him the amount he was required
to pay in order to obtain possession. An equitable solution of this problem
might be to require the true owner, after being restored to possession, to pay
over to the good faith trespasser the net profits derived by him from the
production accruing from the wells drilled by the trespasser until the un-
recovered well costs have been paid. In this manner the risk of continued
profitable production would be placed on the party who should bear that
risk; i.e., the good faith trespasser.
Trespassers do not always drill producing wells. Sometimes they, too,
drill dry holes. Such few cases as we have on this problem are not in agree-
ment as to the proper measure of damages. IL Texas it has been held that
the true owner is entitled to recover the decrease in market value of the
leasing rights resulting from the drilling of a dry hole.' The good or bad
faith of the trespasser was not considered to be legally important, nor was
proof required of the loss of a specific bargain. The Wyoming Court' re-
fused to follow this case, stating that the landowner should not be entitled
to recover for the loss of the market value of something which the trespasser
had proved had no value. Unquestionably, oil and gas rights in lands not
known to contain oil and gas, and which may not contain oil and gas, fre-
quently have a high market value. The problem of the extent to which this
'I1 SUMMERS, OIL AND GAS (Perm. ed) 60 .........
"Jenkins v. Pure Oil Co., 53 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932). See also, Greer v.
Stanolind Oil and Gas Co., 200 F.2d 920 (1952).
"Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Kishi, 276 S.W. 190 (Tex. Comm. App. 1925), on sec-
ond appeal, 299 S.W. 687 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927, error refused).
*Martel v. Hall Oil Co., 36 Wyo. 166, 253 P. 862, 52 A.L.R. 91 (1927).
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speculative value should be protected may arise in many factual situations
othel than the drilling of dry holes by trespassers. Any satisfactory treat-
ment of this difficult problem would require an extended discussion beyond
the scope of this paper.'
This will permit, however, a general treatment of a few additional prob-
lems directly connected with the nature of a landowner 's property rights
in oil and gas beneath his land. It would seem clear that if a landowner is
not regarded as having possession of and title to the oil and gas beneath his
land, he cannot transfer possession and title to a third party. Accordingly,
the theory, of property rights in oil and gas obtaining in a particular juris-
diction is of the utmost importance in determining the nature of property
rights in oil and gas which have been severed from the ownership of the
surface of the land.' In an ownership state a landowner may sever, by grant
or reservation, a fee simple estate (or any lesser estate) in the oil and gas
separate and apart from the surface. This horizontal severance of the land
is regarded as resulting in the creation of two separate and distinct posses-
sory fee simple estates: the surface estate and the sub-surface oil and gas
estate. In a non-ownership state this concept of severance is impossible.
After severance there is still only one fee-simple possessory estate-the land
-and it is burdened with an incorporal hereditament in the nature of a
profit a prendre.
Likewise, the theory entertained in a particular jurisdiction is im-
portant in determining the nature of the estate vested in the lessee under
an ordinary oil and gas lease. In an ownership state, since the lessor has a
possessory fee simple title, the courts are free to construe the oil and gas
lease as creating any estate known to the law. It can be regarded either
as creating a possessory estate in the land; i.e., as a lease of the land for
mining purposes, or a separate possessory estate in the oil and gas. Or, it
can be regarded as creating a non-possessory interest in the land in the
nature of a profit a prendre. In a non-ownership state it cannot be con-
strued as creating a separate, possessory estate in the oil and gas although
it can be construed as a mining lease creating a possessory estate in the
land, or as creating a non-possessory estate in the land in the nature of a
profit a prendre. In other words the ownership or non-ownership theory
does not determine the exact nature of the lessee's estate. This is a metter
of construction for the courts of each state, but the possible estates that may
be regarded as created by an oil and gas lease are more restricted in a non-
ownership state than in an ownership state.'
There would seem to be no difference between ownership and non-
ownership states with regard to adverse possession of land prior to a sever-
ance of oil and gas rights from the land. The adverse possessor upon acquir-
ing limitation title simply acquires all of the property rights of the former
owner.
The difference in theories of property rights does become important,
however, where adverse possession commences after oil and gas rights have
been severed from surface ownership." In an ownership state possession of
"See, KuLp, OIL AND GAS RIGHTS, 533-534; 1 SUMMERS, OIL AND GAS (Perm. ed.)
65-77.
"The cases on severance will be found annotated in 29 A.L.R. 586 and 146 A.L.R. 880.
"'KULP, OIL AND GAS RIGHTS, 578-581.
"KULP, OIL AND GAS RIGHTS, 519-525.
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the surface by the surface owner or by a trespasser cannot constitute ad-
verse possession of the severed oil and gas estate. The only way in which
possession can be taken of the severed, possessory estate in the oil and gas
is by the drilling of a well. In such states it is recognized that this is es-
sential to start the statute of limitations running against the owner of the
severed oil and gas estate. Likewise, it is held that an adverse possessor by
the drilling and operation of wells may acquire limitation title to the severed
oil and gas estate although he does not adversely hold or claim title to the
surface estate.'
In non-ownership states, on the other hand, there is no separate, posses-
sory oil and gas estate. The land is merely burdened with an incorporeal
hereditament in the nature of a profit a prendre. Mere possession of the
surface by the surface owner or by a trespasser would not be sufficient to
give rise to a cause of action so as to start the statute running against the
owner of the severed oil and gas rights. However, active interference, even
by acts confined to the surface, by the surface possessor with the exercise of
the rights of the owner of this profit a prendre would logically seem to start
the running of the statute of limitations.
Many of the more specific problems with regard to adverse possession
of oil and gas involved the interpretation of the language of local statutes
of each state. In my own state of Texas, and I imagine this is true in your
own states, our land limitation statutes were enacted prior to oil and gas
development, and the statutory provisions were drafted to govern adverse
possession by the occupancy of the surface of land. The language of these
statutes is frequently exceedingly difficult to apply to an adverse possessor
who occupies a subsurface estate only by means of wells drilled into that
estate. No attempt will be made to disuss local problems of this type.
Indeed, the general problems which I have already attempted to discuss
are so broad in their scope and fundamental in their nature that I realize,
as I am sure that you now realize, that only the surface has been touched.
Figuratively speaking in the language of the oil fields, I have been able to
drill only a shallow hole into the great field of oil and gas law. I hope
that it has not been entirely unproductive.
'*Crawford v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 150 S.W.2d 849 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941, error
dismissed); Kilpatrick v. Gulf Production Co., 139 S.W.2d 653 (Tex. Civ. App.,
1940 error dismissed).
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